How to Fix Facts and Intelligence, Part Infinity

Because matters couldn't be confusing enough in the Plame-leak case, here's some reason to wonder if Cheney and other senior admin officials ever heard the results of Wilson's trip. How do you fix facts and intelligence around a policy? Start by making sure you hear only what you want to hear. Josh Marshall quotes a WaPo article from June 15, 2003, in which the following appears:
...[T]he CIA did not pass on the detailed results of its investigation to the White House or other government agencies, the officials said.

The CIA's failure to share what it knew was one of a number of steps in the Bush administration that helped keep the uranium story alive until the eve of the war.

A senior intelligence official said the CIA's action was the result of "extremely sloppy" handling of a central piece of evidence in the administration's case against then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

A senior CIA analyst said the case "is indicative of larger problems" involving the handling of intelligence about Iraq's alleged weapons programs and its links to al Qaeda, which the administration cited as justification for war. "Information not consistent with the administration agenda was discarded and information that was ‘consistent’ was not seriously scrutinized," the analyst said.
This is basically what some journalists were reporting before and shortly after the war, and it's what the Pat-Roberts-run Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said they would investigate at some point, some day, if the mood strikes them. Why aren't they? That's a rhetorical question.

UPDATE: In a letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Joseph Wilson said about the SSCI report:
On March 8, 2003, the intelligence report on my trip was disseminated within the U.S. government, according to the Senate report (page 43). Further, the Senate report states that "in early March, the Vice President asked his morning briefer for an update on the Niger uranium issue." That update from the CIA "also noted that the CIA would be debriefing a source who may have information related to the alleged sale on March 5." The report then states the "DO officials also said they alerted WINPAC [Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control] analysts when the report was being disseminated because they knew the high priority of the issue." The report notes that the CIA briefer did not brief the vice president on the report.
(Emphasis mine.)

Corrected: An earlier version of this post said Seymour Hersh reported on the adminisration's skewing of intelligence before the war, when in fact it was after. Knight Ridder reported on it before the war. For a list of Knight Ridder prewar reporting, go here.

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