UPDATE: More Downing Street Memo posts at bottom.
Tuesday, in a joint press conference with Bush and Blair, a non-intrepid reporter finally asked about the Downing Street Memo. Unfortunately, he asked the wrong question and didn't follow up or challenge either party with either the text of the memo or their own words (maybe the rules forbade it--anyone?). The segment of the press conference follows, with comments and quotations from the Memo judiciously intersticed.
Q Thank you, sir. On Iraq, the so-called Downing Street memo from July 2002 says intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy of removing Saddam through military action. Is this an accurate reflection of what happened? Could both of you respond?
Thank you for asking about the memo, but this question, whether intentionally or un-, has a built-in escape route for Blair and Bush. Thus:
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Well, I can respond to that very easily. No, the facts were not being fixed in any shape or form at all.
The memo states: "C [Richard Dearlove, then head of Britain's foreign intelligence service] reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."
Are you saying that Dearlove misunderstood what Bush administration official(s) told him? that his impressions were incorrect? According to a former senior US official, the above paragraph is "an absolutely accurate description of what transpired." We'd like you to clarify, but then you'd have to acknowledge what the memo actually says. And just to follow up, are you saying that Bush officials' unfounded mantras on the Saddam—al-Qaedaconnection(s) and the reconstitution of Iraq's nuclear program were not examples of "intelligence and facts...being fixed around the policy"?
And let me remind you that that memorandum was written before we then went to the United Nations.
Yes, we know. That's kind of the point, isn't it? You and Bush pretty much agreed to overthrow Saddam back in April of 2002, just a few short months after Bush distracted Tommy Franks from Bin Laden at Tora Bora by sending Rumsfeld to get an Iraq invasion plan from him.
Now, no one knows more intimately the discussions that we were conducting as two countries at the time than me. And the fact is we decided to go to the United Nations and went through that process, which resulted in the November 2002 United Nations resolution, to give a final chance to Saddam Hussein to comply with international law. He didn't do so. And that was the reason why we had to take military action.
Bullshit. You had to enforce international law by going against the majority of nations? I suppose you also had to destroy Fallujah in order to save it.
But all the way through that period of time, we were trying to look for a way of managing to resolve this without conflict.
Half-heartedly, if at all. From here it all looked like marketing.
As it happened, we weren't able to do that because -- as I think was very clear -- there was no way that Saddam Hussein was ever going to change the way that he worked, or the way that he acted.
And because he was a cruel dictator that was a former US asset, whom we'd armed and whose chemical and biological weapons programs we'd helped get going, while we ourselves were signatories to the chemical weapons treaty, we just had to invade before the next set of elections because Saddam's regime wasn't an imminent threat. Yes, that makes perfect sense.
As memo (written by Rycroft) says, "The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun 'spikes of activity' to put pressure on the regime."
Which the Times of London detailed over a week ago. We bombed the hell out of Iraq before the invasion, while we were allegedly courting the UN.
"No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections."
PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I -- you know, I read kind of the characterizations of the memo...
He doesn't read the papers, so he wouldn't have read the actual memo.
...particularly when they dropped it out in the middle of his race. I'm not sure who "they dropped it out" is, but -- I'm not suggesting that you all dropped it out there. (Laughter.) And somebody said, well, you know, we had made up our mind to go to use military force to deal with Saddam. There's nothing farther from the truth.
The memo says that "military action was seen as inevitable" and "it seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force." That clear lack of interest in a peaceful resolution would help explain why the US and Britain didn't put much effort into one and why we just couldn't be bothered to let the weapons inspectors finish the job. If they had finished it, we would've seen that there was no WMD and the American public wouldn't have supported the war.
...
And this meeting, evidently, that took place in London happened before we even went to the United Nations -- or I went to the United Nations.
Again, that's the point. According to the memo:
If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work....
...
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN....
...
[The Defence Secretary] said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
And so it's -- look, both us of didn't want to use our military.
So...only you were pushing for it?
Nobody wants to commit military into combat. It's the last option.
Unless you're President of the United States. Then "last" means number two on the list.
The consequences of committing the military are -- are very difficult.
Yes. People die. Other, mostly much poorer people. People you may have met on the day or two you showed up for TANG duty when you were dodging the draft for Vietnam while otherwise supporting other people dying and risking their lives in it, like John McCain and John Kerry, who are real heroes that you mounted dirty campaigns against. You fucking coward.
The hardest things I do as the President is to try to comfort families who've lost a loved one in combat.
Is that because of your nagging conscience? assuming you even have a conscience....
It's the last option that the President must have -- and it's the last option I know my friend had, as well.
Bullshit, bullshit, bullshit. Does anyone believe this?
And so we worked hard to see if we could figure out how to do this peacefully...
Meaning, try to take steps that later you could claim--as you're doing now--showed an intention to resolve the matter peacefully, even though anyone with spine connected to brain stem could tell from the way that you were dragged to Congress and the UN that you didn't really care, that what you really wanted was a war. You miserable fucking coward.
...take a -- put a united front up to Saddam Hussein, and say, the world speaks, and he ignored the world.
That would've been fine, except that most of the rest of the world disagreed with you.
Remember, 1441 passed the Security Council unanimously. He made the decision. And the world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power.
No, it's not. We're not better off. Iraq's not better off. How is trading dictatorship for terrorism and lack of water and electricity an improvement? It's different, yes. Some Iraqis are better off, yes. And Iraq may well be better off in several years. I hope so. They deserve it. But right now a lot of Iraq is a certifiable circle of hell. You, a failed business man in love with risk, took great risks with lives that weren't your own and that weren't yours to risk. Have I mentioned you're a coward?
Related leaked British documents supporting and fleshing out the Downing Street Memo:
- The Cabinet Office briefing paper
- Six short documents dated just before Blair's April visit with Bush, the meeting that the Downing Street meeting minutes are about. Included: Meetings with Rice and Wolfowitz, and the need to "wrongfoot Saddam" (or trip him up) by pushing for the re-entry of weapons inspectors.
Why the Downing Street Memo Matters: an Open Letter to Michael Kinsley and Andrew Sullivan
Newest DSM-ish Docs Verified
Even More Documents
Downing Street Memo: But Wait, There's More!
Whither the Downing Street Memo
He Didn't Get the Memo
Downing Syndrome
Downing Street Memories
When the Levee Breaks
NY Downing Street Review of Books
Questions for Scott McClellan
The Washington Press Corpse: Beginning the Autopsy
Sam Kinison on the Downing Street Memo
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